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Abstract
We discuss the consistency problem for a positive set theory with equality called Strong-Frege-3, introduced
by Hinnion some twenty years ago. We also exhibit “natural” models of some fragments of Strong-Frege-3.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we are concerned with the “positive” set theory Strong-Frege-3, which
can be considered as a sort of “three-valued” analog of Frege set theory.
The peculiar feature of this theory is that, unlike similar theories, the formulas
admitted in the comprehension schema use not only membership, but even equality
and inequality, and both are treated classically.
In [6] and [7], the theory is erroneously attributed to E. Weydert; rather, the ﬁrst
who proposed the theory seems to be R. Hinnion, even though Weydert contributed
a lot in the area with his thesis [10]. In fact, some theories inspired by the same
ideas as Strong-Frege-3 can be found in the works of Hinnion himself, see [3] and
[4], besides those of other researchers such as Brady [1], Gilmore [2] and Skolem [8].
Instead, it seems, [6] and [7] are the only papers dedicated to Strong-Frege-3 itself.
In this introduction we deﬁne the theory Strong-Frege-3, following closely [7].
The name of the theory Strong-Frege-3 is due to R. Hinnion, and its explanation
is the following:
• Strong: in contraposition with another, weaker theory, called Frege-3, where not
only membership, but even equality is viewed as three valued;
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• Frege: in honour of G. Frege, the author of the ﬁrst (although inconsistent) com-
prehension principle for sets, which is the source of inspiration for this (hopefully
consistent) theory;
• 3: because membership is three valued, in that we have two relations ∈ and ∈,
mutually exclusive, and given two sets x, y, we have three possibilities: either
x ∈ y (meaning: x belongs to y), or x∈y (meaning: x does not belong to y), or
neither holds, in which case the membership of x to y assumes an undetermined
value.
A formal account of the theory Strong-Frege-3 is as follows.
We call sets the inner objects of the theory Strong–Frege-3. The formal language
of the theory is the ﬁrst order language consisting of two binary predicates, ∈
(membership) and ∈ (bar-membership), and including the equality predicate =.
First of all we have the following axiom:
Axiom 1. (mutual exclusion) ¬(x ∈ y ∧ x∈y).
This axiom means that ∈ and ∈ are a kind of “weak negation” of each other.
However, since we do not state the reverse arrow of the axiom (which would amount
to say x ∈ y ∨ x∈y), we do not impose a priori that ∈ and ∈ are the real negation
of each other; actually, as we will see, this is provably false in Strong-Frege-3.
In the literature, theories including the axiom 1 are often called “paracomplete”,
whereas theories where x ∈ y ∨ x∈y holds are called “paraconsistent”. A major
diﬀerence between the two options is that topological spaces give natural examples
of paraconsistent models, if one takes pairs of closed sets which cover the universe
(one might think to give paracomplete models by using the dual notion of disjoint
pairs of closed sets, but this approach is not powerful enough for Strong-Frege-3,
although it does work for other theories, see [4]).
A set in Strong-Frege-3 is a kind of “two face medal”, in that it can have zero
or more members, and zero or more bar-members. Anyway, a set is determined by
its members and bar-members, as the following axiom states:
Axiom 2. (extensionality)
(∀t((t ∈ x ↔ t ∈ y) ∧ (t∈x ↔ t∈y))) → x = y.
In other words, any two sets which have the same members and the same bar-
members are equal.
Finally we give the very core of Strong-Frege-3, namely its comprehension
schema. The idea is to repeat Frege’s comprehension schema for set-theoretic for-
mulas, but with the following changes:
• we replace the classical non-membership /∈ with the bar-membership ∈;
• we consider only the “positive” formulas deﬁned below;
• while deﬁning a set by comprehension, we specify both its members and its bar-
members (so, this set will be uniquely determined by extensionality).
To formalize this idea, let us ﬁrst deﬁne the positive formulas:
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Deﬁnition 3. (positive formulas) The set PF of the positive formulas is the smallest
set of ∈,∈-formulas such that:
• x ∈ y, x∈y, x = y,¬(x = y) are in PF for any two variables x, y (these are the
basic positive formulas);
• if φ,ψ are in PF and x is a variable, then also φ ∨ ψ, φ ∧ ψ,∃xφ,∀xφ are in PF.
Let us consider the four kinds of basic positive formulas in two variables x, y: by
mutual exclusion, x ∈ y and x∈y are in a status of mutual weak negation or, since
they are both positive, of positive negation; moreover x = y and ¬(x = y) are the
(classical) negation of each other, and we can consider also their correspondence as
a positive negation, since they are positive by deﬁnition.
So we have a bijection between basic positive formulas, called positive negation;
there is a natural extension of this bijection to all positive formulas by induction,
and we give it in the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4. (positive negation of positive formulas) Give the positive formula φ,
we call positive negation of φ the formula PN(φ), where:
• PN(x ∈ y) is x∈y, PN(x∈y) is x∈y, PN(x = y) is ¬(x = y) and PN(¬(x = y))
is x = y;
• PN(φ ∨ ψ) is PN(φ) ∧ PN(ψ), and PN(φ ∧ ψ) is PN(φ) ∨ PN(ψ);
• PN(∃xφ) is ∀x.PN(φ), and PN(∀xφ) is ∃x.PN(φ).
We write φ instead of PN(φ). We note that, for any positive formula φ, φ is a
positive formula as well, and φ = φ.
Now, because of the presence of ∈ and ∈ in Strong-Frege-3, it is natural to
associate (certain) sets with (certain) pairs of formulas. For example, given two
formulas φ(x) and ψ(x) whose only free variable is x, by extensionality there is at
most one set whose members are those enjoying φ and whose bar-members are those
enjoying ψ. When φ is a positive formula and ψ is φ, this set exists by the following
axiom schema, where b is a variable which is not free in φ:
Axiom 5. (positive comprehension schema)
∀a1, . . . , an.∃b.∀x.((x ∈ b ↔ φ(x, a1, . . . , an)) ∧ (x∈b ↔ φ(x, a1, . . . , an))).
We denote by {x | φ(x, a1, . . . , an)} the set b of the previous axiom.
We call Strong-Frege-3 the ﬁrst order theory whose nonlogical axioms are the
axioms 1, 2 and 5 above. So, we have Mutual Exclusion, Extensionality, and the
schema of Positive Comprehension.
It is not known whether Strong-Frege-3 is consistent. The aim of this paper is
to discuss the consistency of Strong-Frege-3 and of some interesting fragments of it.
2 Remarks
In this section we repeat the remarks on Strong-Frege-3 made in [6].
As we said, a peculiar feature of Strong-Frege-3 is that its sets have “two faces”,
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in that they have members and bar-members, with the constraint that no set can
be both member and bar-member of the same set.
Although positive formulas seem to be a very poor class from the expressive
point of view, the comprehension schema implies the existence of many sets (unique
by extensionality), for instance:
• V ≡ {x | x = x}, the universal set; we have x ∈ V and ¬(x∈V ) for every set x;
• the dual of V is ∅ ≡ {x | x = x}, where x∈∅ and ¬(x ∈ ∅) for every x; note that
this set is not really “empty” because, although it has no members, it has the
property that every set is a bar-member of it;
• for every set a we have the singleton {a} ≡ {x | x = a}; it results a ∈ {a}, and
b∈{a} for every b diﬀerent from a;
• we have the complement a ≡ {x | x∈a}, with the property that x ∈ a if and only
if x∈a, and x∈a if and only if x∈a;
• we have the principal ultraﬁlter Fa ≡ {x | a ∈ x}, with the property x ∈ Fa if
and only if a ∈ x, and x∈Fa if and only if a∈x;
• for any two sets a, b we have the union a ∪ b ≡ {x | x ∈ a ∨ x ∈ b}, such that
x ∈ a ∪ b if and only if x ∈ a or x ∈ b, and x∈a ∪ b if and only if x∈a and x∈b;
• for any two sets a, b we have the intersection a ∩ b ≡ {x | x ∈ a ∧ x ∈ b}, such
that x ∈ a ∩ b if and only if x ∈ a and x ∈ b, and x∈a ∩ b if and only if x∈a or
x∈b.
Union and intersection satisfy the usual laws of idempotence, commutativity,
associativity and distributivity; in particular for every k we can deﬁne arbitrary,
unordered k-uplets by
{a1, a2, . . . , ak} ≡ {a1} ∪ {a2} ∪ . . . ∪ {ak}.
Moreover, note that the universe is inﬁnite, e.g. it contains the inﬁnite sequence
(sn) given by s0 ≡ V and sn+1 ≡ {sn}.
An interesting kind of sets is given by the following
Deﬁnition 6. (cantorian sets) A set x is called cantorian if it veriﬁes ∀y(y ∈
x ∨ y∈x).
We note that: V is cantorian; every singleton is cantorian; and union, intersec-
tion and complement preserve cantorianity. So, there is an inﬁnite boolean algebra
of cantorian sets. However, there are also non-cantorian sets: to ﬁnd some, we
consider what Russell’s antinomy becomes in Strong-Frege-3.
In fact, one might think to prove a Russell-like antinomy, and so the inconsis-
tency of Strong-Frege-3, by using the set
R ≡ {x | x∈x}.
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Actually, from the deﬁnition of R we obtain
∀x.x ∈ R ↔ x∈x
hence, taking x = R
R ∈ R ↔ R∈R
but this is not a contradiction; rather, by axiom 1, we can only conclude that R
is neither a member nor a bar-member of itself, and therefore it is not cantorian.
There is more. Consider now the set
∗ ≡ {x | R∈R}.
From the above properties of R it follows that ∗ has no members and no bar-
members (and it is the unique set with these properties, by extensionality); so, ∗ is
the “real”, bilaterally empty set.
3 Some partial models
The previous remarks show that Strong-Frege-3 is able to provide a variety of set
theoretic constructions. However, as we said, the consistency problem for Strong-
Frege-3 is open. What can be done is giving models of fragments of Strong-Frege-3.
In the following subsections we will consider some interesting fragments and models
for them.
3.1 A model of the theory minus extensionality
A consistent fragment of Strong-Frege-3 is given by axioms 1 and 5, that is, the the-
ory minus the axiom of extensionality. There is a natural “term model” construction
leading to a model of axioms 1 and 5.
First of all, the universe is given by the set ICT of all iterated comprehension
terms, deﬁned inductively by ICT =
⋃
n ICTn, where:
• ICT0 is empty;
• ICTn+1 is the set of all expressions {x | φ(x, t1, . . . , tk)}, where φ(x, x1, . . . , xk)
is a positive formula with k + 1 free variables, k ≥ 0, and t1, . . . , tk are elements
of ICTn.
We point out that ICT is a set of terms, rather than of sets; so, for instance,
{x | x = x} and {x | x = x ∨ x = x} are diﬀerent elements of ICT .
Now, equality in ICT is deﬁned as syntactic equality (so the pair above illus-
trates that the model is not extensional). Finally, ∈ and ∈ are deﬁned inductively by
means of a sequence of pairs of relations ∈α and ∈α on ICT , where α is a countable
ordinal, and:
• ∈0 and ∈0 are empty;
• for any terms t, t1, . . . , tk in ICT , we let t ∈α+1 {x | φ(x, t1, . . . , tk)} if and only
if φα(t, t1, . . . , tk), and t∈α+1{x | φ(x, t1, . . . , tk)} if and only if φα(t, t1, . . . , tk),
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where φα and φα are obtained from φ and φ by replacing ∈ with ∈α and ∈ with
∈α;
• if λ is a limit ordinal, then ∈λ≡
⋃
α<λ ∈α and ∈λ ≡
⋃
α<λ ∈α.
We note that ∈α and ∈α are monotone functions of α, and since their domain is
ICT which is countable, there is a countable μ such that ∈μ=∈μ+1 and ∈μ = ∈μ+1,
and both sequences are constant from μ on. Then we deﬁne ∈≡∈μ, and ∈ ≡ ∈μ.
We note that axiom 1 holds because ∈α and ∈α are disjoint for every α, as can
be proved by induction.
For the comprehension schema, we note that by deﬁnition we have t ∈
{x | φ(x, t1, . . . , tk)} if and only if t ∈μ+1 {x | φ(x, t1, . . . , tk)} if and only if
φμ(t, t1, . . . , tk) if and only if φ(t, t1, . . . , tk), which gives the ﬁrst half of the schema
(the one about ∈); the other half (about ∈) is analogous.
3.2 A model for the quantiﬁer free part
Another way to investigate the consistency problem for Strong-Frege-3 could be
recursion theory. In this section we give a model of a fragment of Strong-Frege-3,
that is the quantiﬁer-free fragment, using recursion theory.
The idea is to view a set of Strong-Frege-3 as a partial function which takes
on (at most) the values 0 and 1, where 1 means membership, and 0 means bar-
membership.
What we need is an injective enumeration of these functions. We proceed as
follows.
In the rest of the paper, let us ﬁx some standard Go¨del-numbering φ of the
partial recursive functions, and let Wi = dom φi (so, W is a numbering of all the
recursively enumerable sets of integers).
Let C be a class of r.e. sets of integers. An enumeration of C is a partial
recursive function f such that
C = {Wf(i) | i ∈ ω}.
Moreover, f is said to be injective if for any two indexes i = j, we have Wf(i) =
Wf(j).
Friedberg in 1958 showed that the class of all r.e. sets has an injective enu-
meration. Here we want to prove the same result for the subclass V01 of all r.e.
sets which encode partial recursive functions valued in {0, 1} (with respect to the
standard encoding of pairs of integers with integers).
To this aim, we recall a lemma by Kummer, taken from Wehner [9]:
Lemma 7. (Kummer [5]) Let A be an enumerable class of r.e. sets of integers,
which can be partitioned in two classes A1, A2 such that:
• every ﬁnite subset of a member of A1 has inﬁnitely many extensions in A2;
• A2 is injectively enumerable.
Then A is injectively enumerable as well.
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So, to have the injective enumeration, let us take in the lemma
• A ≡ V01;
• A1 ≡ {g ∈ V01 | card(g) is even or infinite};
• A2 ≡ {g ∈ V01 | card(g) is odd}.
The hypotheses of the lemma are satisﬁed. In fact, ﬁrst V01 has an enumeration,
because one can design a binary partial recursive function U which is universal for
the unary functions valued in {0, 1} (essentially, we can take U(i, j) = φi(j), except
that U(i, j) diverges whenever φi(j) is an integer diﬀerent from 0 and 1), and now
an enumeration can be obtained from the s-m-n theorem.
Moreover, the ﬁrst condition of the lemma is obviously satisﬁed.
Let us verify the second condition, saying that the set A2 is injectively enumer-
able.
We can write (by Church thesis) a program P , with two inputs i and n, which
behaves as follows.
We know that ﬁnite sets, pairs, and ﬁnite sets of pairs of integers, can be coded
by single integers. So, given a ﬁrst input i ∈ ω, the program P examines the ﬁnite
set g of pairs coded by i, and veriﬁes whether g is indeed a function valued in 0, 1
of odd cardinality (otherwise, P diverges). Then, P takes a second input integer
n ∈ ω, veriﬁes whether n is in the domain of g (otherwise it diverges), and in this
case it outputs g(n). This program P is a computable function of i, so there is a
partial recursive function f such that:
• f(i) is deﬁned if and only if i codes an element of A2;
• when f(i) is deﬁned, we have P (i, n) = Wf(i)(n) (where Wf(i) is seen as a set of
pairs, namely as a function);
• {Wf(i)|i ∈ ω} = A2 (that is, f is an enumeration of A2);
• if f(i) and f(j) are deﬁned and i = j, then Wf(i) = Wf(j) (that is, the enumeration
f of A2 is injective).
So, by the lemma, we have an injective enumeration f01 of the class V01. Let ψi
be the function whose graph (seen as a set of integers) is Wf01(i).
We obtain a model M of the ∈,∈-language by taking ω as universe, and by
writing j ∈ i if ψi(j) = 1, and j∈i if ψi(j) = 0.
The model M veriﬁes Axiom 1 because all the ψi are functions, and Axiom 2
because the numbering f is injective. Let us verify Axiom 5 for all positive formulas
without quantiﬁers.
In fact, let us ﬁrst verify the comprehension schema for every possible atomic
formula occurring in a quantiﬁer-free positive formula.
For x = x (the identically true formula), the comprehension term is the unique
index i such that ψi is the constant function 1.
For x ∈ ∗ (the undeﬁned formula), the term is the index i such that ψi is the
function which is undeﬁned everywhere.
For x = a, where a is an arbitrary parameter, the term is the index of the
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function ψ such that ψ(a) = 1, and ψ(b) = 0 for every a = b.
For x ∈ x we take the function ψ such that ψ(i) = ψi(i).
For x ∈ a we take the function ψa.
For a ∈ x we take ψ such that ψ(x) = ψx(a).
Note that equalities and membership where both sides are parameters reduce to
true or false or undeﬁned, hence they do not need to be considered.
The duals of the previous formulas can be treated by observing that if ψ realizes
a formula φ, then 1− ψ realizes φ.
Now for the union of two sets a, b, we can take the function ψ which takes the
value 1 if at least one of ψa and ψb is 1, the value 0 if both ψa and ψb are 0, and is
undeﬁned otherwise.
Finally, intersection can be obtained from union and complement by the De
Morgan law.
Instead, we cannot show comprehension for quantiﬁed positive formulas in gen-
eral, essentially because the recursively enumerable sets are closed under existential
quantiﬁers, but not under universal quantiﬁers.
3.3 A “term” model of the equalitary fragment
In Strong-Frege-3 we have a “three-valued” analog of the set Vω of the hereditarily
ﬁnite sets in ZF, in the following sense.
Recall that Vω can be deﬁned as the smallest set such that:
• ∅ ∈ Vω;
• if t, s ∈ Vω, then t ∪ {s} ∈ Vω as well.
In Vω we have a natural deﬁnition of equality and membership, and the resulting
structure is a model of several set theories (especially those not including the axiom
of inﬁnity).
We can construct an equivalent of Vω in Strong-Frege-3, which we call V
(3)
ω , and
is deﬁned as the smallest class such that:
• V, ∅, ∗ ∈ V
(3)
ω ;
• if t, s ∈ V
(3)
ω , then t ∪ {s} ∈ V
(3)
ω and t ∩ {s} ∈ V
(3)
ω as well.
Even without assuming the existence of models of the entire Strong-Frege-3, a
“copy” of V
(3)
ω can be obtained by considering the deﬁnition above as a deﬁni-
tion of terms, and by deﬁning equality, membership and co-membership between
terms in a suitable way.
More precisely, we deﬁne the class NT of the normalized terms inductively by
NT =
⋃
k NTk, where:
• NT0 contains only the three elements V, ∅, ∗;
• NTk+1 is NTk plus all the expressions of the forms:
(∗ ∪ {t1, . . . , tn}) ∩ co{tn+1, . . . , tn+m},
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∗ ∪ {t1, . . . , tn},
∗ ∩ co{t1, . . . , tn},
{t1, . . . , tn},
co{t1, . . . , tn},
where n (and m if present) are positive, ti are distinct elements of NTk, and
the lists t1, . . . , tn (and tn+1 . . . , tn+m if present) are ordered alphabetically with
respect to some order imposed on the syntactic symbols which may occur in a
term (say ∗ < V < ∅ < ∪ < ∩ < {<} < (<) <,< co); note that the symbol co is
intended to replace the bar, and is introduced so as to have linear terms, which
are easy to order.
We have that every term of V
(3)
ω is equal to a unique normalized term, equality
between normalized terms is just syntactical equality, and membership and co-
membership are the natural ones. The model given by the normalized terms sat-
isﬁes the axioms 1 and 2 of Strong-Frege-3. Moreover, it satisﬁes the “equalitary
fragment” of Strong-Frege-3, that is, the comprehension schema of Strong-Frege-3
restricted to formulas whose atomic formulas are equalities, inequalities and x ∈ ∗
(note that this is a sub-fragment of the quantiﬁer-free fragment, because quantiﬁers
in equalitary formulas can be eliminated).
By the way, it could be of some interest to notice that all elements t of V
(3)
ω
are deﬁnable by positive formulas, in the sense that for every t there is a positive
formula φt(x) which is satisﬁed only by taking x = t.
In fact, x = V can be written ∀y.y ∈ x; likewise, x = ∅ can be written ∀y.y∈x;
and x = ∗ can be deﬁned “by negation” by ∀y.y = x ∨ ∃z.z ∈ y ∨ z∈y. With
similar tricks, all elements of NT , hence all elements of V
(3)
ω , can be deﬁned. It is
conjectured that these are the only sets deﬁnable by positive formulas in Strong-
Frege-3.
4 The general case
We are left with the problem of ﬁnding models for the full theory Strong-Frege-3.
Let us discuss brieﬂy this point.
Usually, models for positive set theories are found by working in topological
spaces with “not too many” closed sets, and modeling the deﬁnable sets of the theory
by closed sets. However, this “topological” approach fails for the theory Strong-
Frege-3, essentially because any topology containing the sets of Strong-Frege-3 as
closed sets should contain all the coﬁnite subsets, hence all subsets of the universe
should be closed, and the resulting topology (the discrete topology) is useless in
this context.
We have seen that the quantiﬁer-free part of Strong-Frege-3 has a recursively
enumerable model. However, also the recursion theoretic approach has its limita-
tions, because it seems that no class beyond the recursively enumerable is known to
have enumerations without repetitions, and recursively enumerable sets are closed
for existential quantiﬁcation but not for the universal one.
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A third approach could be considering a term model like V
(3)
ω above, but the
fact that membership is not monotonic with respect to inclusion (because of the
presence of equality and inequality) makes it impossible to solve the problem just
with an easy inductive construction. Maybe a more sophisticate quasi-term-model
could do the job.
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